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European approaches to the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical 
weapons—the so-called weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—have undergone a 
profound transformation during the last few decades. This chapter will trace the 
varying European policy responses to WMD proliferation over time and examine 
how European security doctrines have evolved more recently in this area. It will 
focus on processes of doctrinal convergence and divergence both in the three 
major powers in Europe—France, Germany, and the United Kingdom—and in 
other European states with a significant non-proliferation policy of their own, 
especially Austria, Ireland, and Sweden. In this context, it will also take into 
consideration the influence of relevant international organizations such as the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union.
Keywords:   weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, biological weapons, 
proliferation, non-proliferation, strategy, Germany, France, United Kingdom
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THE proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—defined for the 
purpose of this chapter as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons—is widely 
perceived to be a major international security issue. This is clearly reflected in 
major, Europe-wide strategic documents. According to the 2010 Strategic 
Concept of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), ‘the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and their means of 
delivery, threatens incalculable consequences for global stability and 
prosperity’.1 Likewise, the member states of the European Union (EU) declared 
in their 2003 European Security Strategy that ‘proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction is potentially the greatest threat to our security’.2 However, 
proliferation experts also tend to highlight important differences among 
European states in their fight against the proliferation of WMD, with the 2003 
invasion of Iraq—ostensibly a counter-proliferation measure—as one of the 
prime examples. Especially in the nuclear realm, there are obvious cleavages in 
Europe, such as the divisions between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear 
weapon states or NATO and non-NATO members.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine in greater depth to what extent the 
individual non- and counter-proliferation policies in European states actually 
diverge or converge in strategic terms. To this end, it will trace the varying 
European strategic responses to WMD proliferation over time. It will focus in 
particular on the six West European states with the most pronounced non-
proliferation policies. This includes, on the one hand, France and the United 
Kingdom, Western Europe’s two nuclear weapon states, as well as Germany, 
which does not have its own nuclear arsenal but which stores US nuclear 
weapons on its national territory and benefits from NATO’s nuclear umbrella. On 
the other hand, it  (p.627) includes three small, neutral states that have been 
traditionally very active in the area of non-proliferation and disarmament—
namely, Austria, Ireland, and Sweden. This chapter will outline specifically the 
major developments in terms of non- and counter-proliferation in these two 
groups of states. The chapter will conclude that biological and chemical 
weapons proliferation is largely uncontroversial in strategic terms. All major 
actors are firmly committed to non-proliferation and disarmament in this area. 
The nuclear field, however, is more complex: while it is possible to discern 
strong strategic convergence regarding non-proliferation in a strict sense, there 
remains significant strategic divergence regarding important interrelated issues, 
in particular nuclear disarmament and the use of military force for counter-
proliferation purposes.
Major Powers and Non-Proliferation
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Preventing the spread of WMD—that is, non-proliferation in a strict sense—is a 
fundamental norm of international relations that is enshrined in a series of 
international treaties and organizations collectively known as the non-
proliferation regimes. Adherence to the regimes is a key indicator of a nation 
state’s commitment to non-proliferation. However, the non-proliferation 
elements of these regimes are usually only one side of the coin. Equally 
important are the disarmament elements. In other words, there is an implicit 
bargain between those states that do not possess WMD to forgo their 
proliferation and those states that already possess these weapons to disarm. 
Despite this basic bargain, for some states nuclear weapons, the most 
destructive WMD, still have military utility in the form of nuclear deterrence. 
Since the 1990s, there have also been debates about the use of coercive means, 
in particular the use of force, to stop WMD proliferation. These measures, 
usually known as counter-proliferation, have been very controversial. The 
following sections on national WMD strategies and policies will be focused on all 
these key aspects of non- and counter-proliferation.
France
In 1960, France joined the exclusive club of nuclear weapon states. France and 
the United Kingdom remain Western Europe’s only nuclear weapon states. 
However, in contrast to the United Kingdom and other nuclear weapon states, it 
did not develop a policy to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons early 
on. As Beatrice Heuser highlights in a major study on French, UK, and German 
nuclear policies, ‘until the 1980s, France showed little concern about the 
possibility of nuclear proliferation’.3 Most notably, it refused to sign and ratify 
the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the core treaty of the nuclear 
non-proliferation regime, and postponed its accession to the Biological Weapons 
Convention (BWC), the key treaty on biological weapons proliferation, until 1984
—that is, twelve years after the convention had opened for signature. However, 
France was not an active  (p.628) promoter of WMD proliferation.4 Already in 
the 1970s it realized that WMD proliferation was not necessarily in the French 
national interest. At the same time, US pressure in this area intensified, and 
France began to take some initial non-proliferation steps—for example, in 1978 
by joining the London Suppliers Group, later to be known as the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group (NSG), an informal group of states that coordinates national 
efforts to control the exports of nuclear items. Yet, in spite of these steps, France 
tended to subordinate its proliferation concerns to the economic and commercial 
interests of its burgeoning nuclear energy industry, which led to numerous 
conflicts with the United States.5
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It was only in the late 1980s that the non-proliferation stance of France began to 
change more dramatically.6 In this context, the widely cited key moment is the 
French accession to the NPT in 1992. Although there is some debate about what 
explains this step, the step itself is generally recognized as a watershed in 
European non-proliferation affairs.7 It is a reflection of a major rethink process 
among French policymakers in the wake of a number of major proliferation-
relevant events, in particular the discovery of a clandestine Iraqi WMD 
programme after the 1990–1 Gulf War, the break-up of the Soviet Union, and the 
nascent North Korean nuclear weapons programme.8 All these factors led to the 
unprecedented prioritization of WMD proliferation in French security strategies: 
‘The 1994 Defense White Paper emphasized, for the first time in a government-
level policy document, the risks stemming from WMD in general and nuclear 
weapons in particular’.9 This emphasis on WMD proliferation hardly changed in 
the 2013 White Paper, which also remains—in the absence of an explicit national 
security strategy—the most important French document on national security.10
All the non-proliferation efforts of France are firmly embedded within the 
international non-proliferation regimes.11 Apart from the NPT, France joined all 
other key non-proliferation treaties and organizations, in particular the Chemical 
Weapons Convention12 and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 
(CTBT),13 in the 1990s. It is also an active  (p.629) member of all the informal 
export control groups.14 Counter-proliferation or, more generally, the use of the 
armed forces in the fight against WMD proliferation, does not figure prominently 
in the major French strategic documents. Although France is not principally 
opposed to the use of force, the WMD role of the armed forces is focused on 
nuclear deterrence, the defence against WMD attacks, and the technical 
expertise on WMD. Famously, France opposed vigorously the 2003 military 
invasion of Iraq to prevent the development of Iraqi WMD. Moreover, one of the 
driving forces behind its 2003 diplomatic initiative with Germany and the United 
Kingdom in the Iranian nuclear crisis was the desire to avoid another preventive 
war.15 In the following twelve years, Iran—and to lesser extent North Korea—
became prominent examples of the willingness of France to use its diplomatic 
and economic power to prevent the proliferation of WMD after the end of the 
cold war.16
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However, France has also kept its deep-rooted idiosyncratic beliefs regarding 
nuclear matters.17 First, it continues to believe strongly in the benefits of 
nuclear energy and has supported actively the export of domestic French 
nuclear technology and expertise to other countries.18 Second, nuclear 
deterrence remains a crucial pillar of its national defence. Over the years, its 
nuclear deterrence strategy has been updated to account for new developments
—for instance, in 2006, when it began to contemplate the deterrence of regional 
actors.19 In general, there is very little debate within France about replacing 
nuclear deterrence with other forms of deterrence or defence policies. Third, 
nuclear disarmament is not a realistic option in France. Although it took some 
disarmament measures, such as downsizing its nuclear arsenal, dismantling its 
nuclear test sites, and joining the CTBT,20 it does not believe that Article VI of 
the NPT constitutes an obligation to disarm completely in the short term. In the 
words of Bruno Tertrais, ‘any decision by France to give up its nuclear weapons 
entirely would require extraordinary circumstances and profound changes in the 
strategic and political environment’.21
United Kingdom
In the context of its first National Security Strategy, which lists WMD threats 
among the major risks facing the country, the United Kingdom became the only 
case examined in this chapter that has adopted explicit non-proliferation 
strategies. In line with the 2010 Security Strategy, the first strategy, the 
National Counter Proliferation Strategy 2012–2015, adopted a risk-based 
approach that listed the specific WMD risks and how the United Kingdom  (p.
630) could mitigate them.22 The three principal risks included a terrorist 
attack, a state-sponsored attack, and a military crisis involving WMD.23 In 2016, 
in the wake of the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review, the UK 
government updated the first strategy and adopted the National Counter 
Proliferation Strategy to 2020. In broad strategic terms, there are no major 
differences between the first and second strategy. In essence, the UK non-
proliferation policy, as outlined in these documents, is focused on the 
international non-proliferation regimes. Citing the 2015 Strategic Defence and 
Security Review, the 2016 counter-proliferation strategy declares that ‘rules and 
norms to counter the proliferation of illicit arms and weapons of mass 
destruction play a vital role in our security. The United Kingdom has consistently 
been at the forefront of international efforts to tackle proliferation. We devote 
substantial efforts to this and will continue to do so’.24 The strategy emphasizes 
in particular UK membership of and participation in key organizations and 
treaties.25
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In this context, the United Kingdom has adopted a number of diplomatic, 
technical, and financial measures.26 In the diplomatic realm, it influenced, for 
example, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 on WMD 
proliferation, in particular to non-state actors, by proposing the draft resolution 
on which it was built.27 It is also a firm supporter of the Nuclear Security 
summits, a US initiative that aims to tackle the problem of nuclear terrorism. 
The technical and financial measures, for their part, are reflected in the United 
Kingdom’s support for the verification work of the CTBT and CWC,28 most 
notably on the destruction of the chemical weapons arsenal in Syria in 2015. 
Internationally, the United Kingdom is perhaps best known for its key role—
together with France and Germany—in the nuclear negotiations with Iran.29
As this overview demonstrates, the United Kingdom’s fight against the 
proliferation of WMD is based mainly on civilian measures. In fact, UK non-
proliferation policy, albeit a cross-governmental policy field, is led by the Foreign 
Ministry and overseen by the National Security Council (chaired by the Prime 
Minister).30 Yet, the 2003 invasion of Iraq also shows that the United Kingdom is 
willing and able to participate in military  (p.631) counter-proliferation 
measures. However, the Iraq case turned out to be very controversial 
domestically. One study even goes so far as to claim that the United Kingdom’s 
post-Iraq non-proliferation policies have been driven by the desire to avoid 
another preventive war.31 In sum, it can be argued that modern-day UK non-
proliferation policies reflect by and large French efforts in this area.
Historically, however, the United Kingdom has been the more consistent non-
proliferation actor. It was already worried about nuclear proliferation in the 
1960s: ‘For successive post-war British governments, the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons was viewed with increasing alarm’.32 In 1970, the UK government 
became—together with its American and Soviet counterparts—one of the three 
depositary governments of the NPT. It is also one of the original signatory states 
of the BWC. However, in the 1970s and early 1980s, it was not always willing to 
implement strict US-inspired non-proliferation policies. Although to a lesser 
degree than France, it subordinated its proliferation concerns to economic 
considerations, as can be seen in a controversial commercial deal with India 
during this period.33 Yet, as in the case of France and Germany, this began to 
change in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the United Kingdom turned into 
the non-proliferation actor just described.34
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The one area where the United Kingdom has remained a singular case—in 
comparison not only with France but also with other nuclear weapon states—is 
its attitude towards nuclear disarmament. Especially since the end of the cold 
war, successive UK governments have taken a number of practical steps towards 
nuclear disarmament as stipulated by Article VI of the NPT:35 it has been very 
supportive of the CTBT, it has maintained a moratorium on the production of 
fissile material that could be used as an explosive in a nuclear weapon, and it 
has reduced its nuclear arsenal to a point where most analysts agree that it 
maintains only a minimum deterrent.36 It is also a supporter of a WMD-free zone 
in the Middle East. In the words of Lawrence Freedman: ‘Of all the established 
nuclear powers, Britain has appeared for some time to be the best placed to 
abandon its nuclear status’.37 However, in the second decade of the twenty-first 
century it has become clear that the United Kingdom is poised to renew its 
ageing nuclear deterrent and not go down the route of unilateral nuclear 
disarmament.38 In other words, nuclear deterrence will play a key role in the 
United Kingdom’s strategic defence for the foreseeable future.
 (p.632) Germany
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In the early phases of the cold war, West Germany was not a promoter of non-
proliferation. On the contrary, it was seen by other actors as a proliferation 
concern, in particular in the nuclear field. According to Susanna Schrafstetter 
and Stephen Twigge, West Germany ‘was the primary, if unspoken, driver of non-
proliferation policy during this period’.39 Although it forwent the development of 
WMD on its national territory in 1954, the development of German nuclear 
weapon capabilities remained a concern. In 1957, Germany even had a short-
lived agreement with France (and later Italy) to develop nuclear weapons 
outside German territory.40 It was only in 1969, when it signed the NPT after 
intense domestic debates, that it ceased to be a major proliferation concern.41 In 
1972, West Germany also became one of the original signatory states of the 
BWC. However, this does not mean that West Germany became an active force in 
the fight against WMD proliferation. Although it complied widely with 
international non-proliferation standards, it was more interested in promoting its 
growing nuclear industry than in non-proliferation. This was its main focus in the 
context of the NPT.42 In fact, similar to French views at the time, stringent non-
proliferation rules and norms were seen as detrimental to its nuclear industry. 
So, in the 1970s and 1980s West Germany was generally seen as a ‘laggard’ in 
non-proliferation affairs. In this regard, the NPT was a good early indicator: 
Germany interpreted the NPT’s key provisions in a rather lax way, in particular 
Article IV, which guarantees ‘the inalienable right’ to nuclear energy.43 More 
specifically, dual-use nuclear technology, which can be used for both civilian and 
military purposes, such as uranium enrichment, was seen as relevant for 
peaceful purposes and thus was permissible under the NPT. Consequently, West 
German companies were allowed to export these kind of technologies to 
countries with questionable intentions, most notably Brazil.44 Even as late as the 
early 1990s, Germany gave permission for a research reactor to be built in 
Bavaria that uses weapons-grade highly enriched uranium as fuel—a rather 
problematic decision from a proliferation perspective.45
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It was only in the late 1980s and early 1990s that a number of major 
proliferation scandals involving German firms triggered a rethink in Germany.46
Major scandals included the illicit shipment of nuclear fuel to Pakistan and 
support for a poison gas factory in Libya. The latter case in particular caused 
outrage across the world. William Saffire of the  (p.633) New York Times
referred to it infamously as ‘Auschwitz-in-the-sand’.47 Over the years, 
investigative journalism, parliamentary investigations, and a damaged 
international reputation built up the pressure for major reforms to combat 
effectively the proliferation of WMD. Eventually, Germany experienced a major 
strategic shift towards a greater focus on non-proliferation. In the words of 
Harald Müller: ‘Germany today has come to view WMD non-proliferation as a 
cornerstone of its security policy and expends considerable effort in its 
conceptualization and operation’.48 This is also reflected in the 2006 White 
Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr, one of 
Germany’s most relevant security policy documents. It recognizes WMD 
proliferation as the ‘potentially greatest threat to global security’.49 As in the 
case of France and the United Kingdom, the international non-proliferation 
regimes play a key role in this regard. In the post-cold war world, Germany has 
been at the forefront of all major non-proliferation agreements, in particular the 
CWC and the CTBT. It has also turned into a firm supporter of strict export 
controls for dual-use items. More recently, it has been a key actor—together with 
France and the United Kingdom—in the peaceful resolution of the Iranian 
nuclear crisis. Some even argue that this new-found role as a non-proliferation 
actor has become part of the German foreign-policy identity as being a civilian 
power and good international citizen.50 Counter-proliferation, on the other hand, 
plays no major role in German strategic thinking. Although Germany is not 
entirely opposed to military measures in this area, it remains certainly 
sceptical.51 The non-proliferation role of the German armed forces is mainly in 
technical areas related to verification mechanisms or disarmament measures.52
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In addition to the field of non-proliferation in a strict sense, Germany has also 
gained a more prominent role in matters of WMD disarmament. The Foreign 
Ministry, the lead institution in the area of non-proliferation and disarmament, 
has a designated Federal Government Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms 
Control, who coordinates German disarmament efforts. Since the end of the cold 
war it has funded or supported with its technical expertise a number of practical 
disarmament measures, in particular in the former Soviet Union,53 but also more 
recently in Syria to destroy the country’s chemical weapons arsenal.54 It has also 
addressed more controversial disarmament issues. For  (p.634) instance, when 
Guido Westerwelle was Minister for Foreign Affairs (2009–13), the German 
government called for the removal of US substrategic weapons from Europe.55
Germany also collaborates with other like-minded countries in the Non-
Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, which was founded in 2010 to find a 
new consensus on nuclear disarmament in the framework of the NPT.56
However, more radical measures, such as a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Europe, 
have never gained ground in Germany.57 In general, German disarmament 
efforts have been moderate and do not aim at full nuclear disarmament, at least 
in the short term. Rather, complete nuclear disarmament is seen as detrimental 
to Germany’s desire to remain protected under NATO’s nuclear umbrella. 
Consequently, Germany’s position on nuclear weapons has been characterized 
by an ambivalent relationship between nuclear disarmament and nuclear 
deterrence.58
Lesser Powers and Non-Proliferation
As the previous case studies have shown, WMD proliferation has become a major 
strategic concern in all major powers in Western Europe. They also now share a 
common focus on the international non-proliferation regimes to address this 
concern, while military approaches are de-emphasized. However, important 
differences remain, especially regarding nuclear deterrence and disarmament. 
The following sections will examine how the attitudes and policies of three lesser 
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The proliferation of WMD is one of the top risks listed in the 2013 Austrian 
security strategy.59 In its efforts to reduce proliferation risks, Austria 
traditionally emphasizes its full participation in all major non-proliferation 
regimes and its status as host nation of several non-proliferation institutions.60
Regarding the latter, Vienna has been the traditional seat of both the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Preparatory Commission for 
the CTBT Organization. Since 2011, Vienna has also hosted an office of the 
United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. Likewise, Austria has become 
the Immediate Central Contact (‘Executive Secretariat’) for the 2002 Hague 
Code of Conduct, an informal  (p.635) regulation mechanism to prevent the 
proliferation of ballistic missiles.61 Although this does not entail any special 
formal powers for Austria, it ensures that Austria is more directly involved in 
non-proliferation matters than other small states of the same size. Regarding the 
participation in non-proliferation regimes, it should be highlighted that Austria is 
either one of the original signatories or a founding member of all the most 
relevant organizations and treaties, including the IAEA, the NPT, the BWC, the 
CWC, and the CTBT.62 It is also a full member of all relevant informal export-
control institutions, in particular the Australia Group and the NSG.
Given these close relations with the international non-proliferation regimes, 
Austria is widely seen to be a staunch defender of the established institutional 
order and has ensured that it complies internally with all the relevant 
international norms and regulations.63 Since the early 2000s, it has 
demonstrated that it does not shy away from putting up a fight to protect this 
order. This was particularly evident in the case of the discussions about a special 
NSG waiver and a special IAEA safeguards agreement for India between 2005 
and 2008. Many non-proliferation experts argued that these measures would 
undermine core non-proliferation principles, as they would reward India, which 
developed nuclear weapons outside the established nuclear regimes, with 
benefits that are usually restricted to the five officially recognized nuclear 
weapon states. Although Austria refrained eventually from blocking both the 
NSG waiver and IAEA safeguard agreement, it resisted these measures fiercely 
for several years.64
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Owing to Austria’s strong focus on the international non-proliferation regimes, 
its non-proliferation policies are mainly led by the Foreign Ministry and the 
Federal Chancellery.65 The armed forces have only a very minor role, in 
particular regarding capacity-building to implement specific verification or 
disarmament measures in the area of biological, chemical, and nuclear 
weapons.66 As a historically neutral country with a deep-seated aversion to 
nuclear weapons,67 most of Austria’s active international efforts in this area 
have been targeted at concrete disarmament measures, in particular nuclear 
disarmament. It is, for example, an early promoter of a nuclear weapon-free 
zone in (Central) Europe.68 In 1999, the national parliament adopted the Federal 
Constitutional Act for a Nonnuclear Austria, which basically prohibits any kind 
of nuclear-weapon-related activity in Austria and makes it—in principle—eligible 
for joining a nuclear-weapon-free zone.69 In the second decade of  (p.636) the 
twenty-first century, Austria has risen to prominence as one of the key promoters 
of the so-called humanitarian impact initiative, which is essentially a way to 
promote nuclear disarmament by highlighting the devastating effects of the use 
of nuclear weapons on humanity.70 Most notably, it organized the third main 
conference of this initiative, which led to the so-called Vienna pledge—supported 
by 127 states as of April 2016. The pledge calls on ‘all states parties to the NPT 
to renew their commitment to the urgent and full implementation of existing 
obligations under Article VI, and to this end, to identify and pursue effective 
measures to fill the legal gap for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear 
weapons’.71
Ireland
Ireland is generally committed to the goal of non-proliferation of WMD. 
However, there is no major national strategic document that outlines its 
importance in the context of Irish national security policies. The 2015 Strategic 
Document of the Irish armed forces mentions WMD proliferation only 
fleetingly.72 Pundits also highlight that Ireland has no direct stakes in the issue 
of non-proliferation: ‘It has no nuclear industry; it is not a member of a military 
alliance, still less a nuclear one; it is not in a region directly affected by the 
danger of nuclear proliferation’.73 Yet, since the 1950s, Ireland has gained a 
distinct profile in matters of non-proliferation that is not commensurate with its 
power status in international affairs. Similar to Austria, this profile stems from 
its foreign-policy identity based on neutrality. During the cold war, its opposition 
to nuclear weapons and nuclear energy gave Ireland a role it could play as a 
neutral country.74 It rejected the logic of nuclear deterrence between the two 
superpower blocks and opposed the development of nuclear energy on safety 
grounds—both in Ireland and across the Irish Sea in the United Kingdom.75
These two elements of Irish foreign and security policy are still present today.
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However, Ireland is best known for its active promotion of the NPT. Although the 
NPT is mainly the result of superpower agreement, Ireland played an important 
mediating role, most notably through the so-called Irish Resolutions, on which 
the NPT text is based.76  (p.637) Since the entry into force of the NPT, the core 
activity of Irish non-proliferation efforts is focused on the continuous NPT review 
processes.77 In order to underline its commitment to the NPT, Ireland joined the 
IAEA when the NPT entered into force in 1970 and the IAEA became responsible 
for the NPT’s nuclear safeguard provisions. Although Ireland has not played an 
equally important role in the case of other non-proliferation regimes, it is also 
one of the original signatories of the other key non-proliferation treaties, in 
particular the BWC, the CWC, and the CTBT. Likewise, it is a member of all 
informal export-control regimes.
Irish efforts in the non-proliferation regimes are focused not on non-proliferation 
in a strict sense, but on the related issue of nuclear disarmament. In this regard, 
it resembles the Austrian policies already outlined. However, in contrast to 
Austria, Irish policymakers emphasize more the pragmatism—or what Richard 
Sinnott calls ‘incrementalism’—of their approach.78 Although it is possible to 
discern a certain degree of politicization of the disarmament issue in Irish 
politics,79 Ireland still tends to take a more conciliatory stance in controversial 
matters. In the case of the special NSG waiver for India mentioned in the 
Austrian case, Ireland certainly opposed the waiver for the same reasons as 
Austria, but was less dogmatic towards the end of the negotiations.80 In contrast 
to Austria, it does not strive actively to become part of a WMD-free zone either, 
although the idea was discussed in the 1980s.81 However, it is a firm supporter 
of the humanitarian impact initiative. Moreover, it is an active promoter of the 
nuclear disarmament agenda in the NPT, especially as part of the New Agenda 
Coalition, a group of six like-minded states that was established in 1998 to 
promote this agenda.82
Sweden
At the beginning of the cold war, Sweden chose a nuclear path that was very 
different from the one chosen by Austria and Ireland, its fellow neutral states in 
Europe. Whereas the latter two were characterized by their anti-nuclear 
attitudes and emphasis of nuclear disarmament early on, Sweden was originally 
a major proliferation concern itself. It had an active nuclear weapon programme 
in the 1950s and 1960s. Although it never assembled and tested an actual 
warhead, its programme was considered to be technically very advanced.83
However, after a prolonged domestic debate, Sweden abandoned the 
programme for good and signed the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state in 
1968.84  (p.638) Since 1980, Sweden has been also phasing out its numerous 
nuclear power plants.85 In short, by the 1980s Sweden’s nuclear stance 
increasingly resembled Austria’s and Ireland’s anti-nuclear attitudes. This has 
been reflected particularly in Swedish WMD non-proliferation policies.
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Owing to a mix of factors related to security considerations, political culture, 
and domestic politics, Sweden became particularly active in non-proliferation in 
the 1970s—and has remained so well into the twenty-first century.86 In the 
words of a recent study in this area, ‘Sweden has historically been a 
nonproliferation and disarmament powerhouse, which has earned the country 
the status as a White Knight state, a term applied to a select few countries well 
known for long-established support and advocacy of nonproliferation and 
disarmament’.87 Apart from the NPT, Sweden has been an active promoter of all 
major non-proliferation treaties and institutions, including the IAEA, the BWC, 
the CWC, and the CTBT.88 As most other West European states, it is also a 
member of all the informal export-control regimes. Thanks to the build-up of 
substantial expertise and technical knowledge on WMD proliferation matters, in 
particular in the Foreign Ministry, Sweden’s lead institution in this area, Sweden 
has gained a reputation as an honest broker in international non-proliferation 
affairs. In this context, it is also important to highlight the personal commitment 
to the non-proliferation and disarmament cause by numerous Swedish diplomats 
and policymakers, from Olof Palme to Hans Blix.89
As in the case of Austria and Ireland, Sweden has focused much of its activities 
in the framework of the international non-proliferation regimes on disarmament 
activities, in particular the implementation of Article VI of the NPT. Its expertise 
has proven to be crucial: ‘The technical knowledge obtained through its NW 
[nuclear weapon] research provided Sweden with leverage for developing high-
profile disarmament activities with the UN’.90 Contrary to the situation in 
Austria and Ireland, however, active Swedish nuclear disarmament efforts have 
diminished since the 1990s and 2000s. This has been attributed both to 
ideological shifts in successive Swedish governments and to a decreasing 
salience of nuclear disarmament in public discourses after the end of the cold 
war.91 Concrete manifestations of this shift include Sweden’s lack of opposition 
to the NSG waiver and special IAEA safeguard agreement for India and 
Sweden’s abandonment, in 2013, of the previously mentioned New Agenda 
Coalition, which it helped to establish in 1998.92 It is  (p.639) also noteworthy 
that Sweden’s support for the humanitarian impact initiative has been unusually 
passive. Most notably, at the time of writing in 2016 it has not signed up to the 
initiative’s ‘Vienna pledge’, though this may change with a possible reorientation 
of the Swedish government.93 At the very least, in the second decade of the 
twenty-first century, Swedish disarmament efforts are currently in a state of flux. 
Some argue, on a more positive note, that ‘disarmament idealism has given way 
to pragmatism’.94 Yet others perceive a notable decline in the influence of 
Sweden in disarmament matters.95
Conclusion
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In many respects, European nation states have seen a remarkable process of 
strategic convergence in the field of non-proliferation.96 Although from a twenty-
first century perspective it appears to be normal that they agree on the need to 
prevent the proliferation of WMD, historically this is not a given. During the cold 
war, European states had very different attitudes towards non-proliferation. 
Among the established nuclear weapon states, the United Kingdom was an early 
defender of the non-proliferation principle, whereas France worried much less 
about proliferation. During the first half of the cold war period Germany and 
Sweden were even major nuclear proliferation concerns themselves. On the 
contrary, Ireland and Austria were key promoters of international non-
proliferation measures, though always in combination with an equal or even 
greater emphasis on the need for global nuclear disarmament. It was only in the 
1980s that non-proliferation and, more specifically, the international non-
proliferation regimes slowly became a strategic priority in all Western European 
states. At the same time, counter-proliferation, or, more generally, the use of the 
armed forces in the fight against WMD, has never become a priority for any of 
the West European states.
These convergence processes are clearly reflected in common European 
strategic documents, in particular the 2003 EU Strategy against Proliferation of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the establishment of a number of common 
European non-proliferation institutions over time. In practice, European states 
have also stepped up their common efforts to prevent the proliferation of WMD 
since the 1980s. This includes measures as diverse as common dual-use items 
export controls, EU financial support for a wide variety of international non-
proliferation institutions, and the coordination of national policies in multilateral 
forums. The nuclear negotiations with Iran are another important example of 
how European states have been able to maintain a leading role in a major 
proliferation  (p.640) crisis during more than a decade.97 Without major 
strategic agreement on the need to prevent proliferation, this would have not 
been possible.
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However, strategic convergence on non-proliferation does not equal European 
harmony in this area. Important disagreements remain at both the operational 
and the strategic level. Operationally, there is no guarantee that broad strategic 
convergence on ends, ways, and means can be translated into common policies. 
European states may still disagree on the specific implementation of ways and 
means in certain circumstances. Especially, coercive measures such as sanctions 
or the use of the armed forces can easily turn into major points of contention. 
Strategically, it is important to emphasize that non-proliferation is widely 
perceived to be only one side of the coin, with disarmament being the other. In 
the biological and chemical realm this is rarely an issue, but in the nuclear field 
it can be very controversial. Crucially, in Europe strategic convergence on 
nuclear disarmament has not occurred to the same extent as in the case of non-
proliferation. But, given the increasing dissatisfaction among many states with 
the pace of nuclear disarmament at the global level,98 this unequal strategic 
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